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Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities1 was written just after Stein resigned from 
the post as Husserl’s assistant in 1917. Her frustration with Husserl’s working methods, 
and with certain aspects of Ideas II which she worked on as his assistant, contributed to 
her decision, as did her determination to give something of her own to philosophy. She 
set out to solve some of the problems she would have liked to see Husserl address in the 
constitution-analyses of Ideas II at a level more responsive to intersubjectivity2.  
 
The starting point of the work was her doctoral thesis, On the Problem of Empathy. It 
enabled her to conduct the phenomenological analysis in a manner that took 
systematically into account the point of view of others – their moods and feelings as well 
as their thoughts. It was the importance of empathy that made her stand in a certain 
contrast with Husserl, and it was also empathy that enabled her to use Scheler’s insights 
concerning morality more constructively than Husserl did. The topics she discusses – the 
foundation of psychology and the humanities – required this sensitivity to 
intersubjectivity and its moral dimensions, as both of these sciences are concerned with 
the individual as a producer of meaning and as a member of communities.  
 
In the First Treatise the psyche (translated by ‘the sentient’), together with the law that 
governs it (‘sentient causality’ – Psychische Kausalität), are discussed in relation to the 
natural and social worlds. In the Second Treatise the mind (or spirit, Geist – as in 
Geisteswissenshaften) together with the law that governs it (‘motivation’) are discussed 
as the life of individual and communal experiences alike. Comparing the experience of 
the individual with the experience of the community, Stein develops an understanding of 
how we experience something as being communally experienced. She is thus prepared 
not only for the radical contextualisation of personal experience as personal, but also for 
 
1 In German often shortened to: Beiträge, as its entire title, even though precise, is rather longwinded: 
Beiträge zur philosophischen Begründung der Psychologie und der Geisteswissenschaften, Max Niemeyer, 
Tübingen, 1970. Literally this means ‘contributions to the philosophical foundation of Psychology and the 
Humanities. But the team of Catherine Baseheart and Marianne Sawicki chose to translate this by the 
simpler (and equally precise) title: Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities, ICS Press, Washington, 
2000. Very little secondary material exists to illuminate the contents of this text. To my knowledge there 
are only Marianne Sawicki’s three papers: “Personal Connections”; “Edith Stein’s Philosophy of 
Psychology and the Humanities. The Jahrbuch Treatises of 1922”, and “The Defeat of Hume's Association 
Theory in Edith Stein's Psychology”. Apart, of course, from the same author’s discussion of the treatises in 
Body, Text and Science, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1997.  
2 For a discussion of the circumstances, see Marianne Sawicki: Body, Text and Science, Chapters 1 and 6. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
the development of a philosophy of the State and of politics3. As a consequence she 
understands personal experience to be radically immersed in, yet distinct from, 
communal experience, which of course is experienced from within personal experience. 
However, personal experience as personal only fully makes sense as such, when 
distinguished from communal experience. For example: I know what I think about 
something, only when I have made clear to myself what others think, and assess that 
critically. Only then do I know that what I think is not merely ‘taken over’ from 
communal experience (or from someone else’s experience), making me a semi-conscious 
mouthpiece of ‘what is thought’, or of what someone else thinks; only then am I fully 
personal, and fully identified as a person. Until then ‘contagion’ can get the better of me 
and make my behaviour understandable only as a member of the mass, or only as 
manipulated by someone else. 
 
It is the idea of energy and its circulation that enables Stein to consider the relationship 
the psyche has with the network of nature, manifesting itself in the effects sleep, food and 
activity have on experience. It is the same idea that enables her to conceptualise how 
meaning contributes to the life of the individual; establishes community, and structures 
personality. By paying close attention to the phenomenon of psychic energy she reaches 
an understanding not only of what is specific to the psyche (1st Treatise), but also of the 
constitutive role community plays in the experience the individual (2nd Treatise). Such 
attention even enables her to identify various types of communality depending on the 
level of energy shared. Hence her kind of phenomenology incorporates, while also 
providing an investigation of, what later became known as ‘social construction’.  
 
Thus Stein completes her foundation for a philosophical anthropology, sketched in her 
doctoral thesis, by analysing the constitution of the human being as sentient (having a 
psyche) and spiritual (having a mind). She is thereby also accounting for the human 
person’s unique individuality (manifested in one’s soul) and also for the person’s 
indispensable social insertion (in various forms of communality). The anthropology 
expressed in the twin work from 1933, The Structure of the Human Person/ What is the 
Human Being?4, is based on this phenomenological foundation. The phenomenological 
ontology of Finite and Eternal Being5, which Stein described as her spiritual testament, is 
also to be read against the background of the phenomenology developed in Philosophy of 
Psychology and the Humanities. These treatises, in fact, comprise Stein’s independent 
development and original application of phenomenology. She understood the essays to be 
‘Beiträge’ (contributions). This is an adequate enough designation as they build on 
Husserl’s phenomenology and extend it into the foundations of psychology and the 
humanities. That said, however, these treatises also could be viewed as an independent 
attempt to think phenomenology anew, and hence to provide an alternative to Husserl’s 
version. Either way Stein’s philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities is of interest 
 
3 Stein, Edith: Eine Untersuchung über den Staat, Max Niemeyer, Tubingen, 1970. 
4 Stein, Edith: Was ist der Mensch?, Edith Steins Werke, Bd. XVII, Herder, Freiburg, 1994, and Der 
Aufbau der menschlichen Person, Edith Steins Werke, Bd. Herder, Freiburg,  
5 Stein, Edith (Teresia Benedicta a Cruce): Endliches und Ewiges Sein. Versuch eines Aufstiegs zum Sinn 
des Seins, Edith Steins Werke, Bd. II, Herder, Freiburg, 1986. Trans. by Kurt F. Reinhardt as Finite and 
Eternal Being. An Attempt at an Ascent to the Meaning of Being, The Collected Works of Edith Stein, Vol. 
9, ICS Publications, Washington D.C., 2002. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
especially to those concerned with the methodology of these sciences. It also is of interest 
to those concerned with philosophical anthropology and ethics, and is thus of particular 
interest to those searching for a platform for ethics from within the phenomenological 
tradition. 
 
This Study Guide provides a synopsis of the work to support the reading of it, as well as a 
series of questions and answers that might serve as a kind of glossary for understanding 
it. It also provides a very brief bibliography, listing only what is strictly relevant to the 
reading of the work in question. The synopsis follows the articulations of the text, so as to 
reproduce a ‘reader’s digest’ of its argument. It attempts to provide an instrument for 
opening the text, to which end brevity has been prioritised with the aim of referring the 
reader back again to the text. If the present Guide succeeds in this it will have fulfilled its 
purpose. Whenever page numbers are used, they refer to the ICS English translation. It 
should be easy enough to locate these in the German, as they occur within the section 
under discussion6. The questions and answers provide emblematic discussions of themes 
running through the two treatises and turning up again in Stein’s later writings. They 
define terms and place them in relation to others. The select bibliography intends to 
provide the English reader with only what is strictly required. A comprehensive 
bibliography can be found in Marianne Sawicki’s Body, Text, and Science. 
 
This guide is written to be of service to all intending to read the work, who may feel 
deterred by the lack of introductory material available as well as by the difficulty of the 
text itself. 
 
6 The Max Niemeyer edition is soon to be replaced by Herder’s Edith Stein Gesamt Ausgabe. Referring to 
the formers page numbers would thus at this point in time make little sense. 
 
 
 
 
 
First Treatise: Sentient Causality 
 
 
 
The purpose of the treatise is to identify the proper object of psychology. This is, 
according to Stein, sentient causality, which manifests itself in life-power, as distinct 
from motivation. Psychic energy, hence, is the phenomenon that in all its manifestations 
gives rise to our specific understanding of the psyche as something at the interface 
between body (governed by the ‘lawfulness’ of nature, treated by natural science) and 
spirit (governed by the ‘lawfulness’ of motivation, treated by the humanities). It 
manifests itself whenever life-power is experienced, and life-power is experienced in the 
phenomena of vigour and tiredness (and all intermediary and other specific states), which 
I experience as the mode of my experiences beyond the ‘lawfulness’ of the mind, even if 
still under the influence of it. 
 
Psychology, therefore, cannot be an exclusively natural science, as life-power stands 
under the influence of motivation. Nor can it belong exclusively to the humanities, as 
life-power exhibits a conditioning beyond motivation. It must, in order to be true to its 
object (and hence to be properly conducted) study the phenomenon of life-power as it 
manifests itself in behaviour and experience.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Stein is not relying on earlier treatments of sentient causality, i.e. the kind of causality 
operative in the psyche, because none before her had been properly phenomenological. 
Stein makes a preliminary definition of the sentient as the set of coherences of experience 
and its correlates that are affected by life-power, and she understands causality, following 
Husserl, as what characterises physical nature, and as the ‘lawfulness’ investigated by the 
natural sciences. 
 
 
 
I. Causality in the Realm of Pure Experiences 
 
In this section Stein accounts for the bearing causality can be understood to have on 
experience as such. 
 
§ 1. Constitution of experiences  
The current of consciousness as we experience it is already constituted as me-
experiencing-something, and hence constituted as such (i.e. as a stream of experience). 
Yet we can imagine the stream of consciousness as pure becoming, pure 
unarticulatedness, entirely obscure. This is experience without the experience of 
something. However, there is becoming and fading away of phases, and these are what 
make us constitute the entities of experience within the current. Constitution happens, the 
experiencing becomes the experience of something, because things ‘linger on’ in 
experience until you see them and start ‘having an experience’. 
 
§ 2. Classification of experiences  
These experiences get into relationships with one another. Some experiences change into 
other experiences, but not every experience changes into every other. A sound does not 
become a tactile sensation or a vision, for example. Thus various fields into which 
experiences fall are constituted, corresponding to the various senses. Even if these fields 
nearly form individual currents, it must be said that there is one current because there is 
one ‘I’, for whom the current is. 
 
§ 3. Association of experiences 
Experiences occur together – as if it were always on the background of others or in some 
kind of context. Association by contact is a connection of experiences with other 
experiences simply because they occur together. However, such togetherness is by no 
means ‘causal’, i.e. ‘effected’, it is just occurrence, pure becoming. There is no way of 
effecting or bringing about the stream of consciousness: its streaming is radically 
different from physical effectedness. This also means, of course, that there is no way of 
causally inducing any particular experience: intentionality is not causality. 
 
§ 4. Causal Influence on Experiences 
The involvement of causality with experience shows up, in contrast, in the layer of life-
feelings, in vitality. The intensity of the experience is low if I am weary, high if I am 
alert. Various shades of intensity may be experienced: tiredness, sluggishness, 
 
 
 
 
feverishness, vitality or joy. These states, which we feel, appear to us as caused. It is in 
the experience (and not in the content, or in the consciousness of the experienced content) 
that causality is experienced, and it is experienced as distinct from motivation, which 
attaches to the content.  
 
 
 
II. Sensate Reality and Causality 
 
In this section Stein distinguishes sentient causality from natural causality because 
of the former’s experiential structure. 
 
§ 1. Consciousness and Sentience 
It is through the distinction between my immediate life-feeling and the state I am actually 
in, a distinction I must make when for instance feverishness terminates suddenly in 
exhaustion, that I come to distinguish between a true ‘psychic state’ and a deceptive 
consciousness of experience. I can, in other words, be ‘wrong’ about how I really am – 
about how much energy I really have. Such life-power, thus, must be a real property felt 
in the life-feelings, but sometimes deceptively so. Yet I know about the life-power 
always only in this fallible way. However, acquaintance with the signals of deception is 
part of a critical epistemology of inner perception, and we acquire it (well or not so well) 
through experience. What concerns Stein is whether the ‘true’ state is understood to be 
caused, so that the distinction between the true and the deceptive states relies on the 
former being caused and the latter not.  
 
§ 2. The Sensate Mechanism 
Not only is life-power experienced, it looks as though life-power is spent in experiencing, 
and also as if there is a limited amount of it immediately available. This is comparable to 
reactions in the natural realm: here also causality manifests itself as transmission of 
energy; if one ball hits another, the first one slows down. The psychic mechanism may be 
construed as a conversion of life-power into active experiencing, and as a utilisation of 
life-power by active experiencing. As there may be consciousness without psyche, and 
psychic life without consciousness (reduced, that is, to life-feelings alone), this 
mechanism is something specific to precisely sensate (psychic) creatures, involved with 
both causality and motivation. What makes psychic life manifest is life-power. 
 
Some experiences seem not to draw on or contribute to life-power. This depends on 
intensity and the breadth of the range of experiences experienced. This limitation points 
to a characteristic of the psyche, which is receptivity. Receptivity manifests itself as a 
quality only when it is challenged, for example by a change in activity. This challenge 
can be overcome by training (habit), and the development of the relevant faculty remains 
for as long as the activity still requires exertion. In contrast, if the faculty is never used, it 
‘atrophies’ and finally ‘dies’. Faculties, hence, are clusters of ‘facilities’, ‘run’ with the 
help of life-power in the psyche. But their source in the realm of meaning transcends the 
psyche. 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 3. The Sensate and Causal Laws 
Hence all sensate experience is causally conditioned. But it is precisely that: only 
conditioned. There is no causal law to determine what I see, hear, smell etc. at any given 
time: here the laws of motivation come into play. If there were a causal law, there would 
be an experience produced by the life-force, which could be predicted from the amount of 
life-force present at any given time. But life-force is very difficult to measure. It is more 
like a quality than a quantity, and the field of the life-feelings is continuous, so that there 
are always shades of feeling between two qualities. The possibility of positing causal 
laws for life-feelings rests on the classifiability of these various qualities, which however 
are always blurred at the edges. The resulting vagueness generally permits only 
considerations of probability. On the other hand, this does not exclude insight and 
wisdom. 
 
So, can life-force be predicted? Here is where the influx of life-force from the sphere of 
meaning comes in. Because meaning is motivating we cannot determine by the laws of 
causality what the life-power in an individual should at any given moment be. All we can 
do is to observe empirically the power of an individual, i.e. the levels of power that the 
person seems to possess or be able to access. We cannot measure this power, yet we can 
talk about it, as for instance all parents do, when they observe the facility with which 
their children learn different things. 
 
 
 
III. Mental Living and Motivation 
 
 
In this section Stein accounts for how motivation is the basic ‘lawfulness’, i.e. what 
essentially characterises, the life of the mind in its entirety. 
 
§ 1. Motivation as Basic Lawfulness of Mental Living 
Thus, for a full understanding of the psyche we must thus investigate the constitution of 
experiences and take them into account. Up until this point we have considered the 
stream of consciousness to be purely passive. It never actually is experienced thus, of 
course, except perhaps while dreaming. We actively constitute experiences: from 
immanent data in acts (memory, perception etc.) and from transcendent data in objects 
(‘things’, whether physical, psychic or spiritual). The activity of consciousness – in so far 
as it simply points towards something and makes it stand out as something – inaugurates 
a new sphere. Motivation is the lawfulness of this sphere; it is what explains the facts that 
I execute one act because of another. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Motivation, in our general sense, is the
connection that acts get into with one
another: (..) an emerging of the one out of
the other, a self-fulfilling or being fulfilled
of the one on the basis of the other for the
sake of the other (p. 41). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Motivation may be implicit or explicit. Stein also uses the words ‘conscious’ and ‘latent’ 
(not ‘unconscious’), because what is implicit can be made conscious, and is effective in 
consciousness. Motivation encompasses apprehension of a thing, in so far as such 
apprehension is motivated by sensory data. In general, perception motivates 
apperception, which again motivates synthesis, in turn motivating perception, so that 
something analogous to the hermeneutic circle applies to perception as such. The object 
perceived rationally requires a certain perception, and hence rationality is the inherent 
standard of objectivity. 
 
 
 
            Perception 
 
          Synthesis      Apperception 
 
 
 
That there are rationally required responses to motivants of various kinds means that the 
subject can gain insight by explication of the rationality of motivation. This is true not 
only for theoretical acts, but also for practical acts.  
 
 
Within the sense of anything recognised
as valuable, there inheres the notion
that it simultaneously confronts you as
something that ought to be. From that,
the norm is to be inferred, that whoever
brings a value to givenness (along with
its non-existence and the possibility of
materialisation) should set himself the
goal of its realisation (p. 43). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
That the meaning of the act is, properly speaking, the motive does not mean that the act 
in which the motive is perceived plays no role at all in motivation. It is only because the 
act is carried out, that the content is brought to givenness for consciousness. The acts 
bringing the motive to givenness are called motivants by Stein, and the motivated acts 
motivata. Sometimes the motive does not logically require a response, as in logical 
motivation, but instead opens up for a variety of motivata, which can be understood on 
the grounds of the motive. If the motive does not motivate understandable motivata 
 
 
 
 
(perceptions, attitudes, acts, etc.) then the person experiencing them is experienced as 
being deranged. 
 
Because the object transcends the stream (in so far as it is what the act grasps after, in the 
current in front of it, so to speak), there is no continuous field of acts in the current (as 
there are continuous fields of tones or colours). Because of the unity of the current, 
however, there being no act does not mean that there is no experience. But when there are 
acts, the unities constituted by the going forth of motivation remain complexes 
swallowed up by the stream, and they can be recalled as such. This allows me to analyse 
them in their complexity. Understanding, therefore, is re-enacting the motivational 
complex, having the whole complex and its truth in front of me. Whereas re-enactment of 
motivation makes sense, the re-enactment of the causal influences in the current is 
pointless; causal connections as such defy understanding, even though they can be 
explained. 
 
§ 2. Motivation in the Realm of Paying Attention 
The freedom of paying attention relies on its motivatedness. Hence awareness as such is 
motivated, even if it must be conceded that experience (but not its constitution) can be 
inflicted. 
 
§ 3. Attitudes: Their Adoption and Denial 
The freedom of adopting an attitude likewise relies on its motivatedness. This means that 
the hermeneutic circle is operative at all levels of consciousness: 
 
 
Perception motivates attention 
Attention motivates cognisance 
Cognisance motivates judgement 
 
 
Below the level of intentional willing 
Judgement motivates acceptance/rejection 
Acceptance/rejection motivates attitude (implicit 
adoption of values) 
Attitude motivates action 
Above the level of intentional willing 
 
 
Attitudes befall me, yet I can take a stance in regard to them. I can ‘neutralise’ them, by a 
judgement to the effect that they are unfounded. Such adoption or denial of an attitude 
may be part of the attitude, but it may also be the object of a separate act. This is because 
adoption and denial of attitudes have their motives, just as attitudes do. These are the 
values. 
 
§ 4. Free Acts 
Values are freely chosen, even if not always explicitly. They are so, precisely because 
they are implicit in the adoption or rejection of attitudes experienced. The adoption or 
denial of attitudes is executed as experiences in their own right, where the ego is ‘boss’ of 
its own experiences. Such acts are experienced when the whole thrust of the act comes 
out of the ego. These acts of will are, in terms of energy consumption, the most costly 
acts. 
 
 
 
 
IV. Impulse and Inclination 
 
In this section Stein discusses the relationship between motivation and causality in 
the concrete experiences of inclination and impulse. 
 
§ 1. Inclinations and Attitudes 
Inclinations are like attitudes in that they happen to us – they are not free acts. Inclination 
cannot, in other words, be executed; it can only be awakened. It does not necessarily lead 
to a doing; if I accept an inclination, it merely takes hold of me (like an attitude). Again, 
like attitudes, the inclination is objectively grounded, causally dependent, and dependent 
on the influence of the will. It is dependent on the will in three ways: I can withdraw 
attention from the object that grounds it, I can counteract the causal influences, or I can 
influence the causal factors themselves by the will. 
 
2. The Structuration of Impulses 
Inclinations are not always motivated; they may be caused. Such is, for example, the urge 
to get up and move after having remained seated for a long time, or the restless 
movements of the nervous person anxiously waiting. These we call impulses, and they 
are not dependent on having a conscious goal, nor are they felt as a striving. They cease 
when they find their fulfilment. If they did not, their intensity would quickly burn out the 
subject in which they inhere. Also: the subject can put a stop to their consumption of 
energy in a manner no longer explicable in terms of causality. The way in which impulses 
arise and are fulfilled or suspended lets us see the psyche as a reservoir of life-power that 
maintains itself relatively stable through influx and outflow of power. 
 
3. Motivation of Inclining  
Inclining properly speaking, in contrast to impulse, is ‘goal-conscious’. It arises in the 
life-sphere, but is directed by a conscious goal. This makes it partly motivated, even if its 
form of release is the same as with the impulse. It is unlike willing in that it is not entirely 
or purely motivated. 
 
4. Inclining and Willing 
Willing includes not only a goal-consciousness, as in the case of inclination, but also an 
orientation towards one’s own doing. Hence inclining can be directed towards many 
things that cannot be rationally willed: attitudes and feelings, for example, which 
precisely are not one’s own doing. 
 
 
 
V. The Intermeshing of Causality and Motivation 
 
In this section Stein establishes how mental life feeds into psychic life, and how 
sentient causality supports mental life in a sentient person. 
  
§ 1. Causal Conditionality of Acts 
 
 
 
 
For there to be any acts, i.e. for there to be any egoic activity within the sphere of mental 
life that we experience (as distinct from imagine), a certain amount of life-power is 
required. This is true with modification even for the personality that is not causally 
determined (i.e. the pure spirit) – its power, however, will stem exclusively from itself, 
i.e., from its will, and hence it will not be strictly speaking ‘life-power’ but more 
precisely will-power. 
 
§ 2. Influencing of the Sensate Mechanism by the Contents of Experience 
Acts in which ‘matters are given’ do not generally consume life-power in a perceptible 
way. They depend on the level of life-power available at any given moment, but do not 
either contribute to or draw upon life-power. However, emotions, relating to the same 
things (perceived, remembered or whatever) as valuable (having a positive or negative 
value), induce fluctuations in life-power that can be immediately sensed. The egoic 
contents of these emotions contribute to the streaming of life-power, either by drawing on 
it or by enlivening it. The emotion itself is motivated by the value in question, and it is 
rationally motivated in so far as it corresponds to this value in all its dimensions. But the 
way this value as felt impacts on the psyche is causal – the enlivening or the depressing 
character of the feeling is causal in nature. Again, we can turn our attention away from 
the value, influence the causal factors (by medication, e.g.), and by will-power counteract 
the causal factors themselves. Delight, love and pleasure have an enlivening effect on the 
life current, whereas fear, anxiety, and sorrow have a depressing effect. 
 
§ 3. The Co-operation of Causality and Motivation: Sensate and Mental Life Power 
The relation between psychic and mental life-power is more or less like the relation 
between a car’s battery and its engine. It is a prerequisite for mental activity that some 
amount of psychic energy is available, (and to the extent that it is, it also ‘recharges the 
batteries’). However, mental life-power introduces a new level of power transcending 
that of psychic life, as it can import energy from the outside world in an ‘objective’ 
manner – i.e. through its awareness of objects (of value). This new level empowers the 
person to achieve things entirely beyond the realm of sentience. However, the spending 
of mental energy implies the spending of psychic life-power. Whenever mental energy is 
spent on something, less psychic energy is available for something else. Mental energy, 
in fact, is much less limited than psychic life-power. It is the psychic life-power that sets 
a limit on the expenditure of mental energy, but mental energy can also be used in the 
good administration of psychic life-power, so that its capability of supporting mental 
expenditure is maximised. 
 
The replenishment of energy can thus come both from the life-sphere and from the 
mental sphere. Rest in the life-sphere includes the taking of food and drink and sleep, rest 
in the mental sphere is the confidence of someone trusting in God. Similarly such trust 
could also conceivably have the goodness and the meaningfulness of the world as its 
object. 
 
§ 4. Causality and the Efficacy of Will 
Willing consumes the highest amount of psychic life-power among the mental activities 
of living beings. It is also, however, capable of supplying energy out of itself – not 
 
 
 
 
psychic life-power, of course, but mental energy from willpower, which in times of need 
may stand in for psychic life-power. It may stand in also for the resolve or the impulse 
power inherent in motivation, but it cannot produce psychic life-power. You can will an 
attitude: you cannot will an inclination.  
 
§ 5. The Problem of Determination 
The causal conditionedness of psychic states depends upon life-power. But to know how 
any conditioning would turn out in concrete circumstances, one would have to be able to 
foresee the mode of energy in every concrete moment leading up to it. This is not 
practicable. What is practicable is to foresee what a person is capable of doing (within the 
limits of plausibility), from the structure of his or her personality and the circumstances 
under which he or she is made to act.  
(For a discussion of Stein’s argument with Hume, which frames her discussion of psychic causality, see 
Sawicki, Marianne: “The Defeat of Hume's Association Theory in Edith Stein's Psychology”, a paper 
presented to the Eighteenth Annual Symposium of the Simon Silverman phenomenology center, Duquesne 
University, March 10 – 11, 2000. http://mysite.verizon.net/vze3cjre/esonhume.html) 
 
Conclusion  
Those who do not properly distinguish between psychic causality and physical causality, 
on the one hand, and between psychic causality and motivation, on the other, will not be 
able to focus properly the subject of psychology. The subject of psychology being 
psychic causality, this must, in order not to be reduced to something foreign to itself, be 
investigated in its complex relationships with physical causality and motivation, as much 
of its functioning cannot be detached in practice from these networks. What has thus been 
accomplished in the First Treatise is a determination of the subject of psychology in 
terms of which reductionist approaches can be understood for what they are, and 
according to which the science of psychology can find coherence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Second Treatise: Individual and Community 
 
 
 
In this Second Treatise, Stein attempts to delimit the proper subject of the Humanities, in 
the same way as she delimited the subject of Psychology in the First Treatise. This can 
only be done by grasping in its complexity the idea of communal experience, which is 
what all the disciplines of the humanities are dealing with: sociology, history, 
anthropology, law, politics etc. These all have in common that they concern themselves 
with shared experiences and their correlates, social realities. This is why Stein first 
investigates the subjective side of this correlation, i.e. the experienced experience, and 
secondly the objectification resulting from this experience of various groups and 
communities. Generally we talk in objective terms, and overlook the phenomenological 
basis for such objectification. Here this basis is worked out in great detail, to reveal as 
part of our experience the experiences that serve as a foundation for communal 
experiences and hence for our understanding of community as such. 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
We have seen that psychic occurrence is not self-contained. It cannot be explained 
without recourse to the way in which it is influenced from ‘without’, from the natural 
world (as investigated in the First Treatise), and from the sphere of meaning giving rise 
to the social network (as investigated in the present treatise). This social network is 
structured around two forms of communality: community (in which subjects are united 
organically, taking each other as subjects) and society (in which subjects are together for 
rational reasons, a union which is mechanical and in which subjects take each other as 
objects). These two modes are often blended and they are also mixed with natural 
togetherness (which lies on the border between causality and communality), expressing 
itself in the phenomenon of contagion. 
 
Stein divides the treatise into two parts. One is concerned with the current of the 
community, which investigates how communal experience appears (to us, in our 
experience). The other is concerned with community as a reality, in which the various 
forms of community known from within communal experience are identified and 
analysed. 
   
 
 
I. The Experiential Current of the Community 
 
In this section Stein investigates the structuration of the experiential current of the 
community, and compares individual experience with communal experience. 
 
§ 1. The Composition of Communal Experiences 
The pure ego has a unity that cannot be found in the subject of communal experiences. 
However, these are similar and different in 3 regards: (1) according to the subject of the 
experiencing; (2) according to the experience; and (3) according to the kind of current the 
experiencing forms. The subject experiencing communally is ‘we’ whereas it is the ‘I’ in 
experience simply. The experience differs in three respects: in relation to the content, the 
experiencing, and the consciousness of experiencing. In relation to the content, there is a 
distinction between that which the individual experiences as a member of the community, 
and that which he or she experiences as him- or herself. Communal experience has 
content. In relation to the experiencing, we must distinguish between private experiential 
colourings and an experiencing which is not private. There is such a thing as communal 
experiencing. In relation to the consciousness of experiencing, however, we cannot say 
that such exists at the communal level. The consciousness of the community’s 
experiencing belongs only to individuals, whether within or outside the experiencing 
community. 
 
An example that might help us to understand and test Stein’s ideas is that of the Irish 
relationship with the British. Here the content experienced is who the British are, 
experienced in various ways by various individuals, but coalescing into a tapestry of the 
Irish attitude. The experiencing of this communal experience is distinct in each member 
of the community and may even be observed from the outside by means of empathy, but 
 
 
 
 
it still has an identity without which it would not make sense to talk about ‘the Irish 
attitude to the British’. However, the consciousness of this experience lives in the 
individuals: there is no super-individual consciousness apart from the consciousness of 
individuals, even as these experience communal experience to be matrix, guide and 
binding.  
 
The kind of current we can talk about for communal experiences is therefore different 
from that of the individual ego, as the experiences combine in the latter because they 
radiate from a single centre of consciousness. Even so, communal experiences do 
combine into a unity, which may be called the current of the community. It should not be 
forgotten, however, that  
 
the relationship of the communal
experience to the individual
experience is constitution, not
summation (p. 144). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This means that just as the individual constitutes experience to be what it is, communal 
experience likewise constitutes what this experience is. Hence the sense we have of 
communal experience’s being normative. We experience what can be experienced, and 
we know what can be experienced from our experience of communal experience. The 
unity into which communal experiences coalesce is structured by motivational complexes 
and conditioned by physical circumstances. It is studied by the Humanities in various 
ways. 
 
§ 2. Components of the Experiential Current 
Only some components of the individual current coalesce to build up the communal 
current. 
 
a) Sheer sensuality or sensory intuition cannot build up communal experience. This 
means that the community as such has no sensuality, even if its members have. 
“There are no sensory experiences among the communal experiences” (p. 146). 
However, experiences in which sensuality forms the material may combine to form 
the current, but then only because of their meaning. This is also why imagination may 
build up the communal current, in so far as we can distinguish between fantasy 
intuition (which is private) and fantasy intention (which is publicly accessible). 
 
b) Categorical acts, founded as they mostly are on sensory intuitions, are not, however, 
reducible to the latter. Their meaning may build up the communal current, in so far as 
they can be shared and hence be the object of super-individual experiences. What 
pertains to the individual experiencing and what pertains to the meaningful core of 
the experience can only be judged in the concrete case. 
 
c) Affective acts are founded experiences; they are ‘reactions’ to information having 
sensuality as their matter. They have egoic and extra-egoic components, the egoic 
 
 
 
 
ones making objective sense in terms of values felt. This sense can be shared, and that 
is why it gives rise to a deeper kind of agreement, as what is shared is egoic contents. 
The structure of the ego therefore also structures the value-world – the individual’s 
value world as well as the various collective value worlds. The ideal value hierarchy 
is the value hierarchy corresponding to the ideal ego. 
 
d) The confluence of the communal experiences into super-individual experiential 
currents occurs around meaning, and as there may be different meanings so there may 
be different communal streams. The subjects of communal experience are in other 
words identified together with the experience. ‘The Irish experience the British as…’ 
says something about how the British are experienced, but it also identifies who the 
‘Irish’ are (from the perspective of the one using the expression). 
 
§ 3. The Joining of the Experiences in the Current 
Experiences could connect, we saw, in the experiential current of the individual in four 
ways, which we now will examine in order to establish which of them recur as joining 
experiences in the current of the community: association, motivation, causality and 
efficacy of will. 
 
a) Association could take various forms, we saw: it could be by contact, by sense (which 
really is a kind of motivation) and as real disposition of sentience. As the community 
has no unity comparable to the unity of the ‘I’, association by contact, i.e. by 
proximity in the current of consciousness, does not apply. Neither does sentience as a 
characteristic of one organism. This means that association plays no role in the 
constitution of the current of the community.  
 
b) Motivation, in contrast, plays an important role. Complexes of meaning may be 
realised by the individual as well as by the community – as meaning can be shared. 
What unifies the current of the community are those experiences that play a role in its 
growth, and what builds up common experience are motivational structures shared 
through communication. 
 
c) Causality underlies motivational structures in that energy is required to execute them. 
It is brought into play when sentient networks overlap or communicate. They overlap 
when I ‘catch wind’ of someone else’s vigour by being connected directly to his 
power-circuit by means of his physical presence, without him being depleted of 
energy. This is what happens in sentient ‘contagion’. But sentient networks also 
communicate when energy is held in common, so that a real community is formed 
when meaning is shared. Hence, causality does play a significant role in the 
constitution of the current of the community. 
 
Excursus on Sentient Contagion 
 
Sentient contagion can be observed in animals as well as in humans. It presupposes 
psyche and hence bodily awareness, but not the ability to compare impression and 
object (the foundation of rationality). Bodily awareness, or sheer sensory experience, 
 
 
 
 
enables one individual to react to another individual’s ‘body-language’ without 
consciousness of such reaction. When birds flock or fish gather in a school, they 
imitate each other and hence obtain a super-individual co-ordination of behaviour. All 
spontaneous imitation illustrates this phenomenon, which is observable in humans as 
well (in yawning, for example, or in preconscious adoption of accents, etc.). Such 
imitation may be accompanied by understanding, even if that is not always the case. 
Understanding, of course, presupposes mental life. 
 
d) Efficacy of will also connects experiences in the current of the community. Someone 
may be enabled to do something precisely because it has been ordered, and in a 
similar manner the community can undertake actions in common because someone 
takes decisions for it. However, Stein claims that the ultimate responsibility rests with 
the individual, because only the individual person is individual (i.e. simply one), 
incapable of internal faction forming, and hence only it is capable ultimately of 
producing out of itself and from within, the willpower which originates responsibility. 
Willpower, in other words, cannot originate outside individuals. 
 
 
II. Community as a Reality: Its Ontic Composition 
 
§ 1. The Community as an Analog of an Individual Personality 
Having now gained an understanding of the analogy between the life of the individual 
and the life of the community, we can now proceed to compare the subjects of this life. 
We will do this in order to address the relationship between the individual and the 
community.  
 
§ 2. The Community’s Life-power and its Sources 
The individual psyche is made manifest by the way in which life-power structures 
experience and by the way it is experienced in consciousness. 
 
a) Life-power as a property of community. The same is the case for the community. Its 
life-power also manifests itself as structuring the experience of the community and as 
being experienced in the states of the community, as vigour or sluggishness, 
feverishness or depression.  
 
b) The life-power of individuals as a source for the life-power of their community. The 
life-power of the community depends on the life-power of its individuals – they 
contribute some part of their life-power to the life in common, in the measure that 
they live as members of the community. 
 
c) Outsiders as power sources for the community: indirect impacts. ‘Outsiders’, when 
they enter into contact with the community, also contribute to communal living in so 
far as communication as such is community. Even enemies contribute energy to one 
another, in so far as they are open to the influences emanating from each other. 
 
 
 
 
 
d) The significance of social attitudes for the life-power of the community. This 
illustrates how the attitudes of the members of a community towards each other are 
also of great importance for the flowing of the life of the community. Attitudes that 
attain to the core of the person (trust, gratitude, love, mistrust, and hatred) either 
affirm or negate the being of the person. Hence these attitudes either enable or disable 
the person’s powers, and hence render that person capable or incapable of 
contributing power to the life of the community. Such mechanism also works 
between nations: the hatred of a ‘neutral’ country may more seriously disable the 
powers of another nation, than open hostility would do. The hatred, of course, affects 
the person or the community that hates even more deeply than it affects the person or 
the community hated. 
 
e) Objective sources of life-power. Besides these subjective sources of life-power (i.e. 
sources in individuals and communities) objective sources exist: these are the values. 
These concern the landscape, all physical conditions (which apart from providing 
material for creativity also have a mood attached to them), as well as everything 
meaningful (including the meaningless). Thus civilisations contain in their mental life 
sources of life-power in the form of art, literature, etc., which are objectively 
enlivening, both for themselves and also for other cultures that come into contact with 
them. 
 
§ 3. Sentient Abilities and the Community’s Character 
The community is powered by life-power in the same manner as the psyche. This means 
that there is something in the community that can be compared to the psyche of the 
individual, but what exactly is it?  
 
a) The absence of the lower sentient capabilities in the psyche of the community. There 
are no sensory abilities in the psyche of the community, even if its psyche is of course 
founded upon individuals who have such abilities. A group of people is not as such 
blind, even though a group may consist of blind people. 
 
b) Intellectual abilities. It is much easier to talk about an intelligent family or about the 
French ‘esprit’. This is because mental capacities are shared in a more radical way. 
We do in fact talk about ‘French thought’ or ‘German thoroughness’, and by these 
characterisations we mean to say something about the French or the German psyche. 
 
c) The specific character properties, “soul” and “core” of person. Value response is the 
most natural behaviour of the individual person; the person is a value-tropic being. Its 
individuality, the center of and subject for mental activity, is the soul, and it has 
various depths because of its relationship with the person. The person’s choice of 
values incarnates in the soul as depth. Neither the person nor the soul, however, has 
any proper development as such. A person’s character may mature, and the soul may 
ripen, but this doesn’t happen through its own doing, but rather by an ‘otherworldly’ 
power, corresponding to an awakening of the soul to its own depths. There is also 
such a thing as soul-less behaviour, where the kindness that is a static quality of the 
soul shrivels up, perhaps due to a stroke of fate. This shows that it is the person that 
 
 
 
 
has a soul, a body and mind – so that the soul grows out of the core of the person, and 
is built into the core of the person, so that the soul accounts for personal depth and 
structure. However, it is the person who is the ultimate subject. Given that we can talk 
about character properties of a community, the question is whether we can talk about 
the soul of a community. 
 
 
4. The Fundamental Relationship of Individual and Community 
 
Which constituents of the individual personality allow for the formation of community? 
 
a) Commonality of experiential structuration as a basis of social unions. In the first 
place commonality of experience allow for the formation of community. It makes for 
an open plurality of individuals, where people are linked because their personalities 
are isomorphic. They share values (as their experience is structured alike) and hence 
are alike. But they do not constitute a higher-order personality, because they do not, 
simply due to their isomorphy, necessarily lead a life in common. 
 
b) Individual and mass: “mass contagion”. In the second place super-individual sentient 
networks contribute to the formation of community. They make it possible for one 
individual to infect another by transfer of energy, conviction and even ‘ideas’, but the 
energy flowing is weak as it is not supplied by any objectivity, but is only a likeness 
induced by contact. Animals flock together in this way, but what is formed is not a 
super-individual personality, with a single life and a specific character: the mass 
remains a ‘heap’ of individuals without an internal principle of organisation, until or 
unless a leader or leaders emerge, together with stratification usually. When ideas are 
taken over by contagion, this happens by suggestion. A conviction is induced – 
perhaps because the subject is ‘in need of conviction’ – and the greater the power that 
follows from the induction the livelier the conviction will be. The propagation of 
ideas in a mass is therefore more properly expressed as the propagation of conviction. 
And the credulity due to a need for being convinced of something (anything) may 
even be constitutive of a mass. Convictions of values or states of affairs induced in 
this manner do not make the mass into a community: mass action continues to be a 
managed action, not an action in common. 
 
c) Individual and association. In the third place the ability to act purposefully 
contributes to the formation of community. Associations are formed when individuals 
join together for the sake of attaining a particular purpose. Associations do not 
originate, therefore, in the distinctiveness of individuals (as communities do); they 
originate in the institution of the machinery of the association. Thus there is a kind of 
timelessness to the association, as well as fixed roles that can be carried out by a 
number of different individuals of the requisite type. An association acts like an 
individual in the service of its purpose, and though it is relatively independent of its 
members it is nevertheless dependent on community to function properly. 
 
 
 
 
 
d) Individual and community. In the fourth place the soul as subject for value-response 
and mental life reaches out beyond the individual to allow for community formation. 
It does so in the following ways: 
 
aa) Organic nature of the community. It is because of its ‘soul-likeness’ that the 
community grows like an organism and cannot be instituted like an association. The 
soul, in other words, allows for such communal growth. The community is alive in 
virtue of the life of the individual members, it is not brought into existence by an act 
of will, nor can it be maintained by such acts. 
 
bb) Character of the community and typical character of the community member. It is 
also why the community has a character of its own, based on the character of the 
individuals, as in an association. But in so far as there is a community of life, the 
community also has a soul (i.e. a life-centre) which imparts its character to the 
community. There is no life-centre in the association: here the character is based 
exclusively on its structures and the character of its members. The association has no 
soul. 
 
cc) The genesis of community: Reciprocal dependence of individual and community. 
Where community arises out of the common structuration of experience (i.e. around 
social types held in common), these personal unions become the ‘environments’ 
determining the development of the persons making them up. In them the social 
virtues (or vices) are developed, and hence they are valuable in themselves as they 
enable the soul to bloom. 
 
dd) Character, soul, and mind of the community. Out of such communality the 
community character of the individual is also nourished. The more valuable he finds 
the community to which he belongs, the more he will treasure the character that 
makes him a member of this community. If individuals live with ‘the soul open’ to 
one another, then you can talk in turn about a soul of the community, and also of a 
‘mind’, if the common experience allows for a common centre of experience. This 
again might be either at the expense of distinct personal centres or allowing for 
personal life apart from that of the community. 
 
ee) Various types of communities. A collective person is the ideal community, in 
which all members take part with their entire soul as free and responsible persons. 
However, community can still exist even if not all members are free and responsible 
persons. Among higher animals community seems to exist, and also among children, 
because of lives being lived and co-lived understandingly. Hence if community does 
not necessarily presuppose freedom, it does presuppose originality (in the sense of a 
sense – or senses – of identity and similarity). 
 
ff) Representatives of types of community and carriers of communal life. It is possible 
for some members of a community to be carriers of communal life to a greater or 
lesser extent. This depends on the degree to which the individual identifies with 
communal life. 
 
 
 
 
 
e) Mixed modes of social unions. In the fifth place the co-existence of will and soul in an 
individual reaches out beyond the individual to make for a mixture of forms of 
communality: communities may to a greater or lesser extent mix with association, and 
hence bear the mark of greater or lesser institutionalisation. 
 
f) The social types. Hence there are types of sociality corresponding to types of persons. 
The types of sociality in which I participate constitute another way of describing my 
character, in so far as the social types I come to take on, because of the roles I play in 
various institutional or communal settings, correspond to the personal type I am in 
virtue of these. 
 
 
Concluding Consideration: The Distinction in Principle between Sentient and 
Mental Being, Psychology and the Humanities 
What Stein has achieved, as the title of the concluding considerations indicates, is to 
distinguish the principles of psychology and the humanities. These are different: one is 
the psyche, manifested by life-force at the intersection between causality and motivation, 
and the other is mind, the ‘lawfulness’ of which is motivation. She discusses this 
distinction in terms of Rickert’s and Windelbrand’s efforts to define the objects of 
psychology and the humanities, and shows how efforts to reduce psychology to the 
humanities or the humanities to psychology are equally absurd. Such efforts both miss the 
specificity of mental reality and underestimate the kinship between psychology and 
natural science.  
 
 
 
 
Postscript 
 
 
What Stein accomplishes with this treatise is to provide a foundation for Psychology and 
the Humanities. This means that she explains in what their respective objects consist, and 
hence what defines the two sciences that arise from them. Psychology is working at the 
intersection between causality and motivation, an intersection manifesting itself in life-
power. Whereas life-power can be observed, it can be so only in so far as it is 
experienced. That is why psychology is not a natural science like chemistry: It takes the 
psyche for its object, and the psyche is neither sheer nature nor pure mind. It is, in 
contrast, where nature and mind interact. The Humanities, in contrast, are working with 
mental reality as such as their object. They are not, of course, working in the manner of 
the natural sciences, investigating whatever can be understood in terms of causality. But 
the reality with which the Humanities are concerned is not less real than the object of 
natural science; it is of a different kind. Its lawfulness is motivation, and hence the 
Humanities investigate meaning as understood and shared by individuals. As meaning is 
in principle shareable, the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of its sharing is likewise meaningful, and 
gives rise to an understanding of communal experience, which can be explored in order 
to understand community. This is what history, sociology, politics and anthropology do 
explicitly. Language and literature do the same implicitly. The foundation for our 
understanding of group behaviour must be an investigation into how communal 
experience is built up. This is what Stein shows, and also what she provides. Therefore 
‘Contributions to a philosophical justification of Psychology and the Humanities’, may 
rightly be translated with the more succinct ‘Philosophy of Psychology and the 
Humanities’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Questions and Answers 
 
 
 
I. About the object of Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities 
 
 
1. What is Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities about? 
 
It is about what the point and purpose, i.e. what the proper object is, of the two scientific 
disciplines Psychology and the Humanities. The background is that psychology has 
emerged slowly from a context in which it was by no means clear whether it belonged to 
Natural Science, whether it was linked to the co-emerging science of Sociology, or 
whether it was a subject of the Humanities, just like History. Also, with education 
experiencing a surge at the time Stein was writing, due to the admission of women and 
the less well off, the subject of the Humanities became experienced as something 
unwieldy and unorganised because of its rapid growth. It is the purpose of the two 
treatises to furnish the reader with precise definitions of the respective objects of 
Psychology and the Humanities, defining them not only over and against one another but 
also in relation to the Natural Sciences.  
 
 
2. What does Stein understand by Psychology? 
 
Stein defines Psychology as the study of life-power, the energy manifesting itself within 
experience at the intersection between causality and motivation, between nature and 
spirit. Psychology therefore is neither a natural science, which investigates the lawfulness 
of causality, nor is it part of the humanities, which are concerned with complexes of 
motivation. It concerns what does not belong to either of these specifically, namely 
psychic causality, and hence is a science sui generis. Again, however, psychic causality is 
a phenomenon that manifests itself in life-power. Its specific nature requires that methods 
be used which are not designed to detect causality simply (because psychic causality is an 
experienced causality) or to deal with meaning only (because psychic causality is 
experienced as causality and as distinct from motivation). 
 
 
3. What does Stein understand by the Humanities? 
 
The Humanities concern whatever is regulated by the lawfulness of motivation, i.e. all 
experience characterised by being experienced because of another experience. 
Motivation can be seen in individual persons but also in the independent reasons for 
which people act. The reality regulated by the lawfulness of motivation is spirit (Geist), 
and because human beings experience things because of other experiences, they are 
 
 
 
 
spiritual. However, they are not ‘spirits’ in that they cannot be simply reduced to this 
experience of meaning. They also have body and soul, whereas pure spirituality is of a 
different order than either of these. Spirit, in fact, is concretised by meaning, not by 
matter, which means that several individuals can share the same spirituality, and also that 
spirit can be investigated as such in whatever incarnates it, in particular in anything 
produced by humans, such as literature, history or art. It is important to remember that 
Stein’s word for the Humanities, because of her German mother-tongue, is sciences of the 
spirit (Geisteswissenschaften). 
 
 
4. What is the Person, according to Stein? 
 
A person is not necessarily a human being, according to Stein. A person is a principle 
according to which the world makes sense. It may be said that human beings are persons 
because they are rational beings, in so far as rationality as such brings its bearer into a 
conscious or reflective relationship with the world, and hence with the self (rationality 
being the ability to distinguish and compare impression and object). So all rational beings 
would be personal, but all persons would not necessarily be human beings (nor rational). 
To say that a person is a rational being may be true in some cases, but it is not necessarily 
so. There could be beings with a kind of responsiveness to being superior to that of 
rationality, who also would be persons. If persons, however, are material, i.e. have a 
body, then they also have a soul providing the person with depth and reflecting its 
character. So persons are essentially subjects of value-response. To be so they must be 
consciously intentional, but they are not necessarily bodily. A person, hence, is a subject 
that is consciously responding to values. 
 
 
5. What is the Soul, according to Stein? 
 
The soul, for Stein, is the substance of the bodily person, and hence is not only marked by 
its motivations but also embodies them, and converts them into physical expression. This 
means that the soul is experienced as the substrate of the faculties, with permanent 
qualities such as friendliness and purity (due to the self-identifying recognition of the 
other human person and the simplicity of reflective intentionality). The qualities, together 
with the soul, can be temporarily suspended, for example through a ‘stroke of fate’, when 
the depletion of energy is such that the soul is quasi-anaesthetised. But the soul remains 
at the disposal of the person: it is the person who has body, soul and spirit, and who 
integrates them. Hence ‘to lose one’s soul’ could mean to sever it from one’s own person, 
to be a stranger to one’s soul. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II. Concerning the Methodology of Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities 
 
 
6. What is the relationship between Stein’s work and Husserl’s? 
 
As Stein edited what is known today as Ideas II, and also assisted at Husserl’s classes on 
Nature and Spirit in which he elaborated the material presented in that work, she was 
completely familiar with Husserl’s thought. She also, however, spotted a lacuna, one that 
she attempted to fill with her doctoral thesis on empathy. As she grew certain that Husserl 
was not going to take into account the experience of the other and the other’s experience, 
the structure of which she had discussed in her thesis, she decided to end her formal 
collaboration with Husserl as his assistant. It was then that she felt the need to contribute 
in a more formal way to phenomenology the insights she had gained. Thus she decided to 
clarify the relationship between phenomenology, psychology and the humanities. This, 
she did, however, in contrast with Husserl, on the understanding that empathy plays an 
essential role in the constitution of the ‘I’ of the human person. She was so convinced of 
empathy’s importance, that she analysed experience in its two-fold structure: as my 
experience, and as experience shared with others. This effectively enabled her to take into 
account the experience of the other as an essential element of the experience of the self. 
She thus adumbrated what later became known as ‘social constructivism’, issuing from 
the later work of Wittgenstein. 
 
 
7. Is Stein a Phenomenologist? 
 
Stein is in her own understanding contributing to phenomenology (probably throughout 
her entire life). But her understanding of phenomenology is, that it occupies the center of 
philosophy as such, which means that she thinks she could do nothing else than 
phenomenology, given that she is a philosopher. Her commitment to the description and 
discussion of experience as experienced is her ultimate philosophical commitment, which 
means that the kind of arguments she would accept against her philosophy are arguments 
drawn from experience as such. This commitment embodies her understanding of 
experience as the ultimate, prior even to the constitution of the ‘I’. Experience is the 
medium in and through which ‘I’’s are constituted – constituted necessarily and at the 
same time as unique and as reflecting each other, and hence as several. 
 
 
8. What role does empathy play in the Phenomenology of Stein? 
 
Empathy is the act in and through which ‘I’’s are constituted, whether that of myself or 
that of others. It constitutes the relationship between a subject, i.e. a unique pole of 
experience, and experience as such. As it sees this relationship in others seeing it in me, it 
remains an act, which, unlike the function of constitution, can be carried out or not. 
Empathy, in other words, is not ‘automatic’ to the same extent as constitution is. 
However, it is an act sui generis, akin to but not identical with perception, feeling, 
memory and imagination. Its proper object is the experience of another, i.e. experience 
 
 
 
 
experienced by someone who is not me, but like me, whether sensually (as with animals), 
or intellectually (like human beings).  
 
 
9. What does ‘constitution’ mean for Stein? 
 
‘Constitution’ is a term she inherits from Husserl, who uses it systematically to mean the 
way in which things appear to form unities (for me, for us). Constitution happens quasi-
automatically, but not without the activity of the ‘I’. It is the primary activity of the ‘I’, its 
first expression. Whenever there is constitution, there is an ‘I’ (or several ‘I’’s). This is 
why ‘I’’s are constituted as constituting, according to Stein. Constitution is the activity 
basic to intentionality, and therefore basic also to rationality. Whereas animals can be 
said to be intentional, they can so only in the limited sense according to which their 
consciousness is object-directed. They cannot, however (in so far as they are irrational) 
distinguish and compare impression and object. Their intentionality is not reflective. This 
means that they have no understanding of the activity of constitution basic to their 
awareness, and this again means that their access to the realm of meaning is strictly 
limited to their object-awareness. 
 
 
 
III. Concerning the Content of Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities  
 
 
10. What is rationality, for Stein? 
 
Rationality is the quality of acts adequately corresponding to things. It therefore 
presupposes the ability to distinguish between things as they appear to me and things as 
they are. Without this distinction the building up of meaningful experiences would not be 
possible, as it is implicit in the discernment of essence. Rationality applies to all kinds of 
acts, in particular both to emotions, and to judgements involving values. A rational value-
response is one in which the felt or known value is adequately responded to, either by 
feeling or by knowledge. 
 
 
11. Is rationality not relative to the worldview of the rational person?  
 
Stein understands objects to be constituted intersubjectively as well as subjectively. In 
fact the distinction between subjective and intersubjective experience is parallel to the 
distinction between the thing as it appears to me and as it is. Having these two levels of 
constitution is like having two eyes, enabling you to focus, to see from two perspectives 
at once, and judge about distance, size, shape, etc.. What I experience does not make 
sense without the perspective of the other – so much so that if I do not learn to identify 
the other experiencing like me, I can never learn to speak a human language. Things 
make sense because they make sense to several. Even if my experience of what is 
generally experienced, or experienced by certain others, may be erroneous (in much the 
 
 
 
 
same way as perception may be erroneous), I can only know this by the same ability to 
compare my perspective with a more informed one. The idea of an adequate response, 
therefore, is dependent on there being something which is what it is for all perspectives, 
and this is the essence. We must be able to identify these (at least approximately so as to 
intend them) in order to speak a human language, and hence open ourselves up for a new 
level of correction, that of arguments. This means that whereas the adequate response 
may not be known immediately, it can still be known in the same manner as the essence. 
So: yes, rationality is dependent on the world-view of the rational person, but this world-
view makes sense only as a world-view among several people making sense of the 
objective world. That the world is objective simply means that it is the object of the 
intention of one and therefore possibly of many. 
 
 
12. What does Stein understand by ‘value’? 
 
Stein understands the constitution of something to be complete only when it is also 
constituted in its value. This means that something is fully understood only when it is 
known in its essence, and in this essence’s relation to personal valuation as such. The 
value of a thing, thus, is the relationship between it and the person. Because the person is 
the principle of valuation incorporating one’s body, soul and spirit, the depth of one’s 
experience determines which values one takes to be the higher. A shallow person 
understands the superficial values to be the higher (linked to the materiality of its 
physical existence), whereas a person of great depth understands the fundamental values 
to be the higher (those linked to the existence of the person, its dignity and its 
spirituality). Value-response, therefore, not only reveals but also creates the valuing 
person’s character, not arbitrarily, however, but always in relation to the hierarchy of 
values determined by the structure of the person (incorporating materiality and 
spirituality, and being capable of self-identification only in and because of community). 
A value is the meaning of the object in its relation to the person. This meaning is 
empowering for the person (if the value is positive) or disempowering (if the value is 
negative), and is thus an objective source of life-power for the personal individual. 
 
 
13. What is Ethics, for Stein? 
 
Though Stein does not discuss ethics explicitly in the two treatises, she does refer to 
ethical values. These are those that determine whether we regard a person as having a 
good character or not. They are, in other words, those values we appreciate for the sake 
of the community. Community, of course, for Stein, is of paramount importance for the 
individual, as the latter becomes capable of self-identification, of self-knowledge and 
thus of rationality. Ethical values, hence, are those that dispose people to be rational 
others with regards to others or, which is the same thing, true selves. Ethics, hence, is for 
Stein utterly personal (forming the character of each individual according to their value 
response), and utterly communal (at the disposal of all and every person who meets 
others, whose character is formed by their value response).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
14. Why does Stein compare the experience of the individual with communal experience? 
 
Stein compares the experience of the individual with communal experience because the 
individual does so him- or herself. In so far as we grasp our own experience, we do so 
because we can distinguish it from other people’s experience, and can contrast and 
compare our experience with theirs. As was said, this comprising of two perspectives in 
one is the very function of rationality, and it is not only the means through which we 
constitute selves, but also the reason why we constitute communities and forms of 
communality. Communal experience, in fact, has, exactly like personal experience, a 
subject. This subject, however, is not simple, as the ‘I’ is, nor does it have the same 
axiomatic unity. It constitutes its subject along with its experience in the same manner as 
personal experience does, but its subject takes in all those who contribute to the 
experience’s being what it is. In the phrase ‘America lived 11 September with horror’, 
‘America’ refers to all those who identified with America and experienced that date, as 
part of the communal experience of America, with horror. Some individual Americans 
may well have experienced something different from what ‘America’ experienced, and 
might also be aware of the fact. Some of these might even question whether they really 
were Americans, given that they did not experience as ‘America’ did. Such questioning 
forms part of the way in which the individual identifies his or her experience. In general 
we make sense of our own experience by placing it in relation to communal experience, 
whether because we identify ourselves as taking part in the latter, or because we distance 
ourselves from it. We make sense of ourselves in the same manner and for the same 
reason. 
 
 
15. Why, according to Stein, are there different kinds of communality? 
 
The different kinds of communality correspond to different kinds of communal 
experience. Sheer psychic togetherness means that life-power can be transferred from one 
individual to another by ‘contagion’. Such communality humans have in common with 
animals. Association relies on the individuals making a decision about their togetherness, 
and binding themselves and those with whom they associate to fulfil certain objective 
criteria. This form of communality is specific to humans, as it presupposes rationality. 
Community is the higher form of communality. Here, however, the subjects take each 
other as subjects and hold in common not only a decision, but values (perhaps in the form 
of bearers of values or valued things, as in families where common life and origin is 
valued). Community is therefore specific to spiritual beings, as only these respond to 
values and hence receive life-power from the objective world of meaning. There could be 
community among purely spiritual, and hence non-bodily, persons, but it would coincide 
with association, as the subjectivity of such beings would coincide with their objectivity, 
their subjectivity being the object of pure intuition.  
 
 
16. Does there exist community among animals? 
 
 
 
 
 
In so far as animals respond to values (albeit not freely or consciously, but only 
implicitly) they are capable of forming community. This is obvious from the way in 
which they can be companions for humans. However, as they have no reflective 
relationship to the world, they identify values only in the concrete and not as such. This is 
why community, in so far as it presupposes the sharing of abstract values, (something 
which is presupposed for the formation of a value-hierarchy and its embodiment in a 
personality), is not possible among animals. Such community does, of course, exist for 
rational animals, because these are personal, spiritual, and capable of sharing meaning as 
such. In so far as animals are capable of choice one could speak about association, and in 
so far as they are spiritual one may talk about community. But for animals without choice 
and spirituality, the only form of communality available is that of togetherness. However, 
the transfer of life-power that this form of communality relies on, is capable of organising 
swarms of insects, schools of fish and flocks of birds. This it does by means of the psyche 
and the soul, which are possessed by all conscious individuals whether these are rational 
or not. The psyche in which the powers of the senses are rooted enables sense 
impressions in one individual to be expressed so that other individuals can pick them up. 
These individuals recognise the expression of the sense impression and act on it, as if 
they had themselves been impressed in a like manner. Thus the flight of one zebra will be 
picked up as the expression of a perception of danger and hence will be reacted on in the 
same manner by all zebras that perceive the flight of the first zebra. The movement of the 
entire group, herd or flock also produces a momentum of its own, enabling the 
individuals to fill only a limited role in the entire scheme and hence to profit from 
leadership. Such momentum can also be transmitted across species, and hence animals 
can keep each other company and provide each other with the consolation of 
companionship. The soul, being the centre of identification for the individual, enables the 
individual to recognise and hence affirm the existence of another in friendliness. Such 
consolation of friendliness is for all animals and all conscious beings of the deepest 
ontological importance, as it exemplifies a perspective on one’s perspective, and hence 
allows for objective self-identification and for an objective sense of existence (in rational 
animals characterised by reflexivity). One self for another self presents the first not only 
with confirmation that he exists himself, but also that such things as selves exist, and 
hence that there is meaning. That there is meaning means that community is possible. The 
other self, therefore, always meets me with the challenge of the establishment of 
community: of communication and of a shared world. For animals the world as such does 
not make sense, and whereas we can share our lives with them, we cannot share our 
world with them. For this other selves are required, and hence the ‘perspective on 
perspectives’ that rationality provides. But that we can share our lives with them is a kind 
of communality.  
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